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Organizational design has long represented a challenging endeavor, but this 
challenge is exacerbated when attempting to design collectivities comprised of multiple 
organizations. Nonetheless, we can bring to bear the rich armamentarium of Contingency 
Theory to help guide our inter-organizational design endeavors. A fundamental problem, 
however, stems from the predominate research focus on static fit, a focus that is 
incommensurate with the fundamentally dynamic nature of organizations and their 
environments. Most key organizational environments are inherently dynamic, hence the 
corresponding organizational designs required for fit are necessarily dynamic too. This 
problem grows even more severe in the context of inter-organizational design, 
particularly where the participating organizations comprising a collectivity come and go 
over time. Addressing in part some longstanding calls in the literature for more dynamic 
conceptualization of fit, a novel approach utilizes the dynamical language and integrated 
system of concepts, definitions and interrelationships from the engineering field 
Aerodynamics. This approach is broadly applicable, and it can help to elucidate 
organizational design and engineering issues even in the very complex context of inter-
organizational collectivities. In this article, we begin with a focused summary of such 
dynamic fit conceptualization, and we illustrate its use through empirical application to a 
very complex inter-organizational case involving thousands of participating organizations 






































Organizational design has long represented a challenging endeavor, for attempting to 
establish and preserve good fit—which Donaldson (2001) defines as a match “… 
between the organization structure and contingency factors that has a positive effect on 
performance” (pp. 7-10)—is a complex undertaking (Burton, DeSanctis, & Obel, 2006). 
Unlike the design of engineered artifacts and physical systems (e.g., airplanes, bridges, 
computers), the components of which include generally highly predictable and very well-
understood parts and subsystems, the design of organizations (e.g., business, government, 
non-profit) involves people, routines and like elements, which are comparatively much, 
much less-predictable and -understood (Nissen & Levitt, 2004). Using Ackoff’s (1971) 
terms, design in the former sense pertains to organisms, in which purposeful action 
applies to the whole system only, whereas design in the latter sense pertains to 
organizations, in which such purposeful action can be identified in the constituent system 
parts as well; designing systems in which the constituent parts have wills of their own 
involves considerable uncertainty and unpredictability. 
This challenge is exacerbated when attempting to design collectivities comprised of 
multiple organizations. Not only are the constituent parts (esp. people) of such 
organizations willful and unpredictable, but the organizations themselves are purposeful 
and unpredictable as well; hence the considerable uncertainty and unpredictability 
associated with design are magnified in the inter-organizational context.  
Nonetheless, we can bring to bear the rich armamentarium of Contingency Theory 
(Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Woodward, 1965) to help guide our 
inter-organizational design endeavors. Contingency Theory is very well-established in the 
organization and management sciences and has supported organizational design for more 
than half a century. Moreover, myriad empirical studies (e.g., Argote, 1982; Donaldson, 
1987; Hamilton & Shergill, 1992; Keller, 1994; cf. Mohr, 1971; Pennings, 1975) support 
our understanding of how different organizational designs affect fit with a wide variety of 
multiple, often-conflicting contingencies (Gresov, Drazin, & Van de Ven, 1989; Gresov 
& Drazin, 1997; Meyer, Tsui, & Hinings, 1993; Whittington & Pettigrew, 2003). Further, 
we have for several decades been conceptualizing and analyzing multi-organizational 
designs, including Divisionalized Structures (Mintzberg, 1979), Network Organizations 
(Miles & Snow, 1978), Clans (Ouchi, 1980), Virtual Organizations (Davidow & Malone, 
1992), Platform Organizations (Ciborra, 1996) and other organizational collectivities. 
A fundamental problem, however, stems from the predominate research focus on static 
fit, a focus that is incommensurate with the fundamentally dynamic nature of 
organizations and their environments (Donaldson, 2001; Sinha & Van de Ven, 2005). 
Most key organizational environments are inherently dynamic (Yu, Tu, & Pattipati, 
2008), hence the corresponding organizational designs required for fit are necessarily 
dynamic too (Nissen & Leweling, 2008). This problem grows even more severe in the 
context of inter-organizational design, particularly where the participating organizations 
comprising a collectivity come and go over time, through a multi-organizational 
instantiation of discontinuous membership (Ibrahim & Nissen, 2007).  
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Addressing in part some longstanding calls in the literature for more dynamic 
conceptualization of fit (Burton, Lauridsen, & Obel, 2002; Zajac, Kraatz, & Bresser, 
2000), a novel approach (Nissen & Burton, 2011) utilizes the dynamical language and 
integrated system of concepts, definitions and interrelationships from the engineering 
field Aerodynamics. This approach is broadly applicable, and it can help to elucidate 
organizational design and engineering issues even in the very complex context of inter-
organizational collectivities. In this article, we begin with a focused summary of such 
dynamic fit conceptualization, and we illustrate its use through empirical application to a 
very complex inter-organizational case involving thousands of participating organizations 






In this section we draw heavily from Nissen & Burton (2011) to outline a novel 
approach to dynamic conceptualization of fit, which utilizes the dynamical language and 
integrated system of concepts, definitions and interrelationships from the engineering 
field Aerodynamics. Aerodynamics (Houghton & Carruthers, 1982) concerns the motion 
of systems designed for flight (e.g., airplanes), most of which are highly dynamic, 
controlled systems; that is, the systems themselves reflect inherent dynamic capabilities 
(e.g., speed, stability, maneuverability) that are designed in, but they receive directional 
inputs (esp. from pilots) during flight (e.g., taking off, climbing, turning).  
Airplane designers analyze the intended uses (e.g., family recreation, passenger 
transportation, military combat) and expected environments (e.g., clear weather, turbulent 
storms, hostile airspace) to tailor design characteristics and capabilities in ways that 
balance often-competing design goals such as system performance, reliability and cost. 
As such, airplanes are designed deliberately to fit their intended uses (e.g., commercial 
aircraft vs. military fighters) and expected environments (e.g., extreme weather vs. enemy 
fire), and different designs are required to fit different use-environmental contexts; large 
commercial passenger jets are unable to land on aircraft carriers, nor are naval fighter jets 
able to carry hundreds of passengers, for instance. 
Human activity systems such as organizations are not engineered physical systems like 
airplanes, but both represent classes of systems (Checkland, 1981)—indeed, open systems 
(Johnson, Kast, & Rosenzweig, 1964; Kast & Rosenzweig, 1972), which are engineered, 
managed (Feigenbaum, 1968) and  controlled (Beer, 1966)—and share attributes (e.g., 
recognizable inputs, outputs, boundaries and others) at some level of abstraction (Sauser, 
Boardman, & Verma, 2010; von Bertalanffy, 1969). Here the abstraction is much more 
about the design of airplanes and organizations than their control. Hence the airplane-
organization analogy draws much more closely on engineers (i.e., who design airplanes) 
than on pilots (i.e., who fly them). 
Pilots do their best to control the airplanes that engineers have designed, but (in the 
short-term) they have negligible control over the designs themselves. Likewise, managers 
do their best to control the organizations as designed, but (in the short-term) they have 
negligible control over the designs themselves. When we use the term organizational 
management in this discussion, we refer to managers in a role comparable to that of pilot: 
focused on maneuver and control. When we use the term organizational design, 




A. BASIC CONCEPTUAL MODEL 


















, the aerodynamics concepts and relationships between static stability, 
dynamic stability, maneuverability and technology are depicted in a manner that can 
apply to the domains of both airplanes and organizations. We diagram these central 
concepts and interrelationships as boxes and arrows in the figure and explain them below. 
 
Figure 1 Basic Conceptual Model [adapted from (Nissen & Burton, 2011)] 
 
Table 1 summarizes the four key concept definitions and provides examples from both 
the airplane and organization domains. First, static stability, which concerns a system’s 
initial resistance to deviation from its dynamic trajectory from an external force, maps 
from airplane design to organization design by considering performance. A statically 
stable airplane resists deviation from its intended altitude, for instance, by wind gusts, 
and a statically stable organization resists deviation from its intended profit2
Dynamic stability, which concerns the quickness of a system’s return to its dynamic 
trajectory after deviation from an external force, maps from airplane design to 
organization design by considering performance also. A dynamically stable airplane 
returns quickly to its intended altitude, for instance, after deviation by wind gusts, and a 
dynamically stable organization returns quickly to its intended profit level, for instance, 
after deviation by changed consumer preferences. Hence dynamic stability limits the 
 level, for 
instance, by changed consumer preferences. Hence static stability limits initial 
performance deviation (e.g., maintaining desired airplane altitude, maintaining desired 
organization profitability).  
                                                 
1 Simplification is important, for our understanding of organizations as human systems does not 
support the kinds of precise, mathematical representations and corresponding analytical methods used to 
model, design and analyze airplanes and like physical systems. Such simplification also facilitates 
translation of research along these lines to the organization and management domain. 
2 As a note, we can substitute a multitude of alternate performance measures for airplanes (e.g., 
heading, speed, attitude, fuel efficiency, passenger comfort) or organizations (e.g., market share, cycle 
time, liquidity, operating margin, employee welfare) to emphasize model generality. 
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duration of performance deviation (e.g., maintaining desired airplane altitude, 
maintaining desired organization profitability). 
 
Table 1 Concept Definitions and Examples [adapted from (Nissen & Burton, 
2011)] 
Concept Definition Airplane Organization 
Static stability A system’s initial 
resistance to 
deviation from its 
dynamic trajectory 
from an external 
force 
Initial resistance to 
deviation in 
altitude from wind 
gust 
Initial resistance to 
deviation in profit 
level from change in 
consumer 
preferences 
Dynamic stability Quickness of a 
system’s return to 
its dynamic 
trajectory after 
deviation from an 
external force 
Quickness of return 




Quickness of return 
to initial profit level 
following a 
deviation from 
change in consumer 
preferences 
Maneuverability Quickness of a 
controlled system’s 
planned change 
from one trajectory 
to another 
Quickness of 
planned change in 
direction  
Quickness of 
planned change in 
product lines  
Technology Enhances control 
















Maneuverability, which concerns the quickness of a controlled system’s planned 
change from one trajectory to another, is inhibited by stability and vice versa: the more 
stable an airplane, for instance, the less maneuverable it is, and the more stable an 
organization, for instance, the less maneuverable also. A maneuverable airplane can 
change direction or altitude, for instance in response to the pilot’s goal change, quickly, 
and a maneuverable organization can change product line or profit level, for instance, in 
response to the manager’s goal change quickly as well. Hence maneuverability limits the 
duration of goal deviation (e.g., achieving a new airplane heading or altitude, achieving a 
new organization product line or profitability). 
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Finally, technology can enhance control of a dynamic system. Computer flight control 
systems, for instance, enable pilots to control highly unstable yet maneuverable airplanes 
(e.g., to maintain desired heading and altitude), and management information systems, for 
instance, enable managers to control highly unstable yet maneuverable organizations 
(e.g., to maintain desired product line and profitability). Hence technology moderates the 
interrelation between maneuverability and dynamic stability. 
Technology can play other roles as well, both in terms of the control and design of 
airplanes and organizations. Consider airplane simulators, for instance, which pilots use 
extensively to practice both routine and dangerous maneuvers in the safety of ground-
based, computer systems with no risk to life or aircraft. Likewise, managers can practice 
both routine and risky decision making, for instance, through organization simulation 
systems (Gopinath & Sawyer, 1999; Sterman, 2000) with no risk to careers or profits. As 
another instance, consider computer-aided design and engineering systems (CAD/CAE) 
that enable engineers to evaluate the system properties and behaviors of myriad alternate 
airplane designs through corresponding virtual prototypes. Likewise, virtual organization 
design systems (Gateau, Leweling, Looney, & Nissen, 2007; Levitt, Thomsen, 
Christiansen, & Kunz, 1999) enable organizational designers to evaluate the system 
properties and behaviors of myriad alternate organization designs through corresponding 
virtual prototypes.  
  
B. ILLUSTRATIVE AIRPLANE AND ORGANIZATION TRAJECTORIES 
The illustrative airplane and organization trajectories delineated and described in this 
section provide concrete examples derived from the basic conceptual model above. Such 
examples are kept purposefully very simple (e.g., linear motion, discrete time, single 
variable) to illustrate the key points of comparison and insights from our airplane-
organization analogy. Given the considerable sophistication and empirical power of 
Aerospace Engineering, more complex applications are straightforward to conceive; we 
leave such conceptualization to future research.  
1. Static stability 
With continued simplification of aerodynamic theory as above, we annotate 
Figure 2 to delineate a very simple, linear trajectory of an airplane (i.e., “Airplane A”) in 
terms of the single variable altitude (in kilometers) over time. We use this and like 
figures below for analytical description and conceptual illustration. The eight circular plot 
points in the figure delineate the airplane’s altitude at discrete times during flight. 
Beginning with level flight at the goal altitude of 4 km, the figure depicts a disruption 
(e.g., wind shift) that changes the airplane’s altitude from the goal to the 3 km level. This 
altitude change from goal can be viewed as a 1 km performance deviation. Static stability 
characterizes how resistant airplane performance is to environmental disruptions; despite 
the word “static,” this term describes a dynamic property of airplanes (i.e., resistance to 
disruption). Notice that such dynamic property is designed into the system by engineers 















Figure 2 Airplane A Trajectory [adapted from (Nissen & Burton, 2011)] 
  
In this example the magnitude of altitude change (i.e., 1 km performance deviation) 
provides a basis for comparison with the static stability of other airplane designs. An 
airplane that experiences less altitude change from a particular disruption can be said to 
reflect greater static stability than an airplane which moves more (and vice versa). 
Indeed, an ideal system (e.g., perfectly stable airplane) would experience no altitude 
change from the disruption and hence not spend any time away from the goal. The 
horizontal dotted line in Figure 2 depicts how the trajectory of a perfectly stable airplane 
would remain at the 4 km altitude level and experience no performance deviation. The 1 
km altitude change experienced by Airplane A reflects lesser static stability than that of 
an Ideal System. 
In terms of organizations, we annotate Figure 3 to delineate a very simple, linear 
trajectory of an organization (i.e., “Organization A”) in terms of the single variable profit 
(in $billions) over time. The eight circular plot points in the figure delineate the 
organization’s profit at discrete times during operations. Beginning with steady profit at 
the goal level of $4B, the figure depicts a disruption (e.g., changed consumer 
preferences) that changes the organization’s profit from the goal to the $3B level. This 
profit change from goal can be viewed as a $1B performance deviation. Static stability 















Figure 3 Organization A Trajectory [adapted from (Nissen & Burton, 2011)] 
 
A key insight from our airplane-organization analogy emerges: the performance 
deviation associated with airplane static stability is analogous to the manner in which 
many scholars characterize the converse of organizational fit (Donaldson, 2001): “misfit 
produces a negative effect on organizational performance” (p. 14). Misfit is a deviation 
from the ideal or goal state and provides a basis for comparing the relative misfit of other 
organizations. An organization with greater performance deviation (e.g., from 
environmental disruption) is in greater misfit than one with lesser deviation. Hence static 
stability and misfit represent relatively good analogs: the greater the static stability of an 
organization, the lesser the performance deviation it experiences from environmental 
disruption.  
2. Dynamic stability 
Notice that airplane static stability as reflected in Figure 2 does not take into 
account the time in flight spent at an altitude below the 4 km goal. Even as a dynamic 
concept, it is insensitive to how quickly the airplane returns to its goal altitude: it 
addresses the magnitude of performance deviation but does not address time. The same 
applies to organization static stability reflected in Figure 3: it is insensitive to how 
quickly the organization returns to its goal profit level, and it addresses the magnitude of 
performance deviation but does not address time.  
In contrast, as depicted in Figure 4, dynamic stability represents both the magnitude 
and duration of performance deviation (i.e., 1 km x 5 t = 5 kmt altitude change for 
Airplane A) and characterizes both how much and how long system performance is 
affected by the disruption: it measures explicitly how quickly the system returns to its 
goal altitude as well as the extent of altitude change. As above, the combined magnitude 
and duration of performance deviation provides a basis for comparison with the dynamic 
stability of other airplane designs. For a given altitude change from a particular 
disruption, an airplane that spends less time away from the goal can be said to reflect 
greater dynamic stability. When viewed in comparison with an ideal system (e.g., the 
horizontal line at goal altitude in Figure 4), dynamic stability can be measured as the area 
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between the ideal and focal system trajectories; the greater the area, the lesser the 























Figure 4 Airplane A Dynamic Stability [adapted from (Nissen & Burton, 2011)] 
 
Further, Airplane A pays something of an instability penalty: since it exhibits lesser 
dynamic stability than the Ideal System does, it spends more time away from the goal 
altitude and incurs an opportunity loss during this period away from goal (e.g., consider 
burning fuel at a faster rate while at lower altitude). When viewed in comparison with the 
Ideal System Trajectory in Figure 4, opportunity loss can be measured as the area 
between the ideal and focal system trajectories also; the greater the area, the greater the 
opportunity loss and vice versa. Hence, as shown in the figure, we can relate dynamic 
stability to opportunity loss. 
In terms of organizations, the dynamic stability concept incorporates time explicitly 
into our conceptualization. Most directly, we can characterize dynamic stability in terms 
of the combined magnitude and duration of an organization’s performance deviation from 
the goal. When viewed in comparison with an ideal organization, dynamic stability can 
be measured as the area between the ideal and focal organization trajectories; the greater 
























Figure 5 Organization A Dynamic Stability [adapted from (Nissen & Burton, 
2011)] 
 
Figure 5 illustrates this conceptualization with a comparison of trajectories 
between an ideal organization (i.e., represented by the horizontal dotted line with no 
performance deviation from the $4B goal profit level) and that of Organization A. This 
graphic is identical to Figure 3 above, except we label the static and dynamic stability 
explicitly for Organization A. Specifically, we show static stability as the magnitude of 
performance deviation ($1B) associated with the environmental disruption at Time 1 and 
dynamic stability as the area between the ideal and focal organizations’ performance 
trajectories (i.e., combined magnitude and duration of deviation; $1B x 5 = $5B). As in 
the static case above, the horizontal dotted line in Figure 5 depicts how the trajectory of 
an organization with perfect dynamic stability would remain at a goal level (e.g., in terms 
of a $4B profit level) and experience no performance deviation for all seven time periods. 
The lesser dynamic stability (i.e., greater dynamic instability) exhibited by Organization 
A reflects a $5B instability penalty, which can be interpreted as an opportunity loss.  
3. Maneuverability 
As above, we annotate Figure 6 to delineate the dynamic trajectory of Airplane A 
in terms of altitude over time but here to illustrate the concept maneuverability. A goal 
change (e.g., to avoid colliding with another airplane) at Time 1 shifts the airplane’s 
desired altitude from 1 km to the 4 km level, and every altitude below the new 4 km goal 
can be viewed as a performance deviation that persists until the new goal is reached (e.g., 
six time periods for Airplane A).  
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Figure 6 Airplane A Maneuverability [adapted from (Nissen & Burton, 2011)] 
 
Maneuverability in this example represents the magnitude of altitude change that an 
airplane can make per unit time: the more maneuverable that an airplane is, the greater 
change in altitude it can make in a given amount of time, or the less time it requires for a 
given change in altitude. As depicted in the figure, the maneuverability of Airplane A 
(i.e., .5 km/t) reflects its ability to increase altitude by half a kilometer in each time 
period. Unlike our stability examples above, where the airplane trajectory is disrupted 
externally, here we are examining what can be done purposefully to an airplane (e.g., 
change altitude).  
Indeed, an ideal system (e.g., perfectly maneuverable airplane) would make the change 
in altitude immediately and hence not spend any time away from the new goal. This is 
depicted by the Ideal System Trajectory delineated in the figure; the Ideal System stays at 
the 1 km goal altitude through Time 1, after which it increases to the 4 km level 
immediately after the goal change. As above, the combined magnitude and duration of 
performance deviation provides a basis for comparison with the maneuverability of other 
airplane designs. For a given altitude change from one goal to another, an airplane that 
spends less time away from the new goal can be said to reflect greater maneuverability. 
Likewise, for a given period of time away from the new goal, an airplane that effects 
greater altitude change can be said to reflect greater maneuverability.  
Further, Airplane A pays something of an unmaneuverability penalty: since it exhibits 
lesser maneuverability than the Ideal System does, it spends more time away from the 
goal altitude, and as above it incurs an opportunity loss during this period away from 
goal. When viewed in comparison with the Ideal System Trajectory in Figure 6, 
opportunity loss can be measured as the area between the ideal and focal system 
trajectories; the greater the area, the lesser the maneuverability, greater the opportunity 
loss, and vice versa. Hence, as shown in the figure, we can relate maneuverability to 
opportunity loss. 
In terms of organizations, consider the maneuverability of Organization A with its 
trajectory depicted in Figure 7 along with that of the corresponding ideal organization. In 
this comparison, Organization A requires six time periods to respond to a goal change 
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(e.g., strategy shift) at Time 1. In comparison with the ideal organization trajectory—
which reflects perfect maneuverability—we show a $9B area between the ideal and focal 
organizations’ performance trajectories. The lesser maneuverability exhibited by 
Organization A reflects a $9B unmaneuverability penalty, which can be interpreted as an 
opportunity loss.  
Time


















Figure 7 Organization A Maneuverability [adapted from (Nissen & Burton, 
2011)] 
 
4. Stability-Maneuverability Tradeoffs 
An important tradeoff in aircraft design exists between stability and 
maneuverability. The tradeoff obtains because design aspects that contribute to aircraft 
stability (e.g., size, front loading of mass, rear concentration of pressure) degrade 
maneuverability and vice versa. In terms of organizations, an analogous design tradeoff 
would imply that highly stable organizations would not be particularly maneuverable and 
vice versa. The implication is that, when designing an organization to produce consistent 
results through environmental disruptions (i.e., emphasizing stability), for instance, 
management would have to sacrifice some capability for rapid organizational change 
(i.e., de-emphasizing maneuverability). Likewise, when designing an organization to 
enable rapid change (i.e., emphasizing maneuverability), as a counter instance, 
management would have to sacrifice some capability for robust performance (i.e., de-
emphasizing stability).  
5. Technology 
Leveraging the fundamental tradeoff noted above, in today’s Aerodynamics we 
note the counterintuitive trend in which modern aircraft are designed intentionally to be 
inherently unstable: unstable design enhances maneuverability. The problem is, of 
course, that such unstable yet maneuverable aircraft are exceptionally difficult to 
control—indeed beyond the ability of human pilots. It is only through the active 
assistance of technology such as computer flight control systems, and with a human pilot, 
that such aircraft can be flown at all.  
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In terms of organizations, substantial research addresses the role of information 
technology in balancing organizational flexibility with control (Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Kauffman, 1995) through real-time information, 
forecasting, marketing, product design and supply chain management (Sabherwal, 
Hirschheim, & Goles, 2001). Organizational instability through deliberate design, 
combined with analogous “flight control” management processes and information 
technology (Arciszewski, de Greef, & van Delft, 2009; Fan et al., 2010), may lead to 
greater maneuverability and may be essential for highly maneuverable organizations to 
be controlled at all.   
  
C. EXTENDED CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
At this point in the discussion, we have sufficient conceptual grist and organizational 
analogs to extend the conceptual model of dynamic organizational fit. In particular, 
summarizing from the discussion above, we identify the magnitude of performance 
deviation as key to empirical measurement of static stability, the combination of 
magnitude and time for dynamic stability, and the rate of change for maneuverability. 
Although it does not generate a straightforward approach to measurement, we also 
indentify information technology as central to the technology concept, and we include 
both instability and unmaneuverability penalties—and their corresponding opportunity 























Figure 8 Extended Conceptual Model [adapted from (Nissen & Burton, 2011)] 
 
This extended conceptual model is clearly very similar to its basic counterpart 
depicted in Figure 1, but it reflects several important extensions. For instance, in the 
extended conceptual model, we include operationalized constructs that suggest an 
approach to empirical measurement of key concepts (e.g., measure static stability through 
magnitude of performance deviation). We further identify penalties (e.g., instability 
penalty) and corresponding opportunity losses in terms of dynamic stability and 
maneuverability, and we include an explicit focus on information technology to enhance 
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management control over organizations. This extended conceptual model of dynamic 
organizational fit, particularly with its operationalized constructs, outlines a theory-based 





III. EMPIRICAL DISASTER RELIEF CASE 
In this section we summarize briefly the pertinent aspects of a very complex inter-
organizational case involving thousands of participating organizations attempting to 
provide multinational disaster relief following the 2004 earthquake and resulting tsunami 
in the Indian Ocean. Here our intent is not to detail results from an in-depth case study; 
rather, we draw from secondary data sources (Comfort, 2006; SAS-065, 2008; SAS-065, 
2010; Schulze, 2006; Sharpe & Wall, 2007; Telford & Cosgrave, 2006) to establish 
sufficient context and grist to illustrate the dynamic fit model described above. The 
interested reader is directed to the list of references for additional details. 
Beginning with the key dates, on 26 December 2004 an extremely powerful (e.g., 
magnitude greater than 9.0 on the Richter Scale) undersea earthquake struck in the Indian 
Ocean just west of Indonesia. The nearby Aceh Province was devastated by a strong 
tsunami that was generated by this earthquake. 200,000 of Aceh’s people were killed, 
including 50 percent of the civil service officials. More than a half million people were 
left homeless, and nearly a quarter of the infrastructure was destroyed, including most of 
the government offices located in coastal areas. Initially, the affected people did whatever 
they could to survive. After the tsunami receded, people’s attention turned to rescue and 
relief. This effort reflected negligible, formal organization: people in local communities 
worked in an ad-hoc manner to help others in their communities. 
 On the following day, the Indonesian Vice President and advisory staff surveyed 
and assessed the tsunami devastation, and shortly afterward, the Indonesian Military 
massed to lead search and rescue, as well as mass burial, activities in the region. The 
Military also initiated an effort to help coordinate aid. The Military, with its stereotypical, 
unified chain of command and hierarchical organizational control structure, operated 
effectively within the scope of tasks that it set for itself, and during this initial period of 
reaction to and relief from the tsunami devastation, the two “organizations” (i.e., the 
Indonesian Military and the ad-hoc collections of people in local communities) operated 
independently of one another for the most part. 
 The International Community responded then with an outpouring of assistance. 
For several instances: the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team 
arrived before New Years Day; nearly five thousand military troops from 11 foreign 
countries (e.g., Australia, Singapore, the United States) came to assist the Indonesian 
Military with its relief efforts; and by 31 January 2005, more than 3500 non-government 
organizations had arrived to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Several 
parts of the Indonesian Government beyond its military (e.g., its Central Planning 
Agency BAPPENAS, the Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Board BRR) 
got involved in the effort as well. Combined, this represents a huge number of relatively 
unaffiliated organizations attempting to work together in a hastily formed, inter-
organizational collectivity. 
 Moreover, although all of these organizations were operating on scene at the 
request of and to assist the Indonesian Government, the Government was not in charge in 
the sense of directing their activities; rather, most of the various organizations 
accomplished the tasks that they knew best and perceived as most appropriate. Also, 
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although the Indonesian Military coordinated with the militaries of several other nations, 
the resulting multinational military coalition did not coordinate actively or effectively 
with the myriad non-military organizations that were participating in the area.  
Further, although the participants of this inter-organizational collectivity shared 
several common goals at a relatively high level, the collectivity as a whole was far from 
goal-congruent. Indeed, reports abound of considerable conflict, mistrust and friction 
between many of the different participating organizations, particularly those representing 
different interests (e.g., Indonesian Military and foreign militaries, militaries and non-
government organizations, Indonesian and international non-government organizations). 
Indeed, the affected region marked the location of considerable anti-government rebel 
activity; yet even the Indonesian Military and opposing Rebel Forces shared the goal of 
overcoming the tsunami effects. 
For certain, this inter-organizational collectivity was not designed explicitly; rather, it 
emerged and grew in a largely ad-hoc manner, albeit on a grand scale. Nonetheless, such 
collectivity reflected at least partially shared goals, and through a rational organizational 
lens, it can be considered to represent an “organization” (Scott, 2003). As such, fitness 
would apply, and although somewhat messy, the collectivity can be described in terms of 
its (organizational) structure and (design) configuration. Hence it provides a challenging 
yet feasible focus of our dynamic fit conceptualization. 
Following this tsunami relief phase of activity (e.g., roughly from December through 
May), the most pressing needs in terms of emergency response had either been met or 
become moot, and the composition and character of the inter-organizational collectivity 
shifted toward longer term efforts associated with recovery and reconstruction. Many of 
the several thousand organizational participants in the collectivity dropped out, and the 
ad-hoc nature of the inter-organizational collectivity began to give way to more 
centralized organization led by the Indonesian Government. 
We focus principally on the initial phase, concentrating in particular on the tsunami 
relief that followed immediate response in terms of search and rescue, for it reflects in 
particular the implications of dynamic organization and fitness. Further, our secondary 
data (SAS-065, 2008; SAS-065, 2010) provide a basis for instantiating the dynamic fit 
conceptualization characterized above. For instance, we have a timeline of roughly six 
months (i.e., December through May) that can be used to instantiate the dimension time, 
and these secondary data also provide the performance measure maturity level, which 
characterizes roughly (e.g., on a 5-level Likert scale) the relative degree of sophistication 
and efficacy in terms of inter-organizational collaboration and management. Moreover, 
we gain insight into the required degree (i.e., Level 4) of sophistication and efficacy 
(SAS-065, 2010, pp. 76-78). This maps relatively well to our conceptualization of what 
would be expected of an ideal organization.  
In particular, a total of three, different, modal maturity levels are reported (SAS-
065, 2010, pp. 99-101) during this time period: 1) the Indonesian Military and foreign 
military organizations operated at the relatively high Level 4; but 2) interaction of the 
militaries with non-government organizations (and between the myriad non-government 
organizations themselves) was evaluated at the very low Level 1; and 3) a 
“characteristic” Level 3 mode was assigned to the time periods and activities preceding 
and following our tsunami relief efforts of interest. When viewed in terms of inter-
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organizational design and fit, we consider the entire set of participating organizations, 
including the Indonesian and foreign governments and militaries as well as humanitarian, 
local and other non-government organizations, and we draw upon the corresponding 
ratings to instantiate the dynamic fit model below; that is, we examine and consider the 
















IV. MODEL APPLICATION 
In this section we instantiate the dynamic fit model by drawing from the tsunami 
relief discussion above in order to illustrate the model empirically. We do so through two 
application steps: 1) first we discuss inter-organizational design and fit in terms of 
dynamic stability; 2) we then follow with discussion in terms of maneuverability. 
A. DYNAMIC STABILITY ILLUSTRATION 
Figure 9 illustrates our initial application of the dynamic fit model to the tsunami relief 
effort in terms of Step 1. This illustration is very similar to the dynamic stability figures 
presented above for airplanes (see Figure 4) and organizations (see Figure 5). On the 
horizontal axis, we display the applicable months in 2004 and 2005 (i.e., December 
through May) pertaining to the tsunami relief effort, and on the vertical axis, we include 


























Figure 9 Dynamic Stability: Tsunami Relief Application 
 
The trajectory, as delineated by circles plotted for each monthly time period, pertains 
to performance of the inter-organizational collectivity as a whole (i.e., Indonesian and 
foreign governments and militaries as well as humanitarian, local and other non-
government organizations) from November 2004 through June 2005. It begins at the 
characteristic mode Level 3 and reflects the two-level degradation to Level 1 
corresponding to the tsunami relief effort. As noted above and illustrated in the figure, 
this level persists through about May, after which the effort transitions toward the next 
phase, and the maturity level returns to its characteristic modal level. Notice, in some 
contrast with the airplane and organization trajectories described above, this 
characteristic modal level does not represent the “goal,” per se; rather it represents the 
relative degree of sophistication and efficacy in terms of inter-organizational 
collaboration and management that existed immediately prior to and following the 
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tsunami relief effort. We discuss dynamic performance in terms of required performance 
level (i.e., as a goal proxy) and maneuverability subsequently. 
Here in Figure 9, static stability can be measured through the two-level decrease to 
Level 1 (i.e., static stability = 2L: 2 levels), and dynamic stability can be measured 
through additional consideration of the five month disruption period with performance at 
this level (i.e., dynamic stability = 2L x 5 mo = 10L-mo: 10 level-months). This reflects 
the inherent instability associated with the (implicit) inter-organizational design, which 
we quantify here as the area beneath the characteristic mode line to calculate the 
instability penalty and corresponding opportunity loss of 10 level-months.  
Unlike an airplane burning fuel at a faster rate when flying at low altitude or an 
organization losing billions of dollars when neglecting shifts in consumer preferences, it 
is more difficult to provide concrete implications of instability penalty and opportunity 
loss in terms of tsunami relief. Nonetheless, when thousands of people’s lives are at stake 
and millions of people are displaced, such penalty and loss have very real implications in 
terms of human death and suffering. If 10 level-months of instability penalty corresponds 
to, say, 100,000 deaths and a quarter million people displaced (i.e., roughly half the 
number of deaths and displacements reported in the case), then every 1 level-month 
translates to an associated opportunity loss in terms of a 10,000 lives that could have been 
saved and 25,000 people that could have avoided displacement. This operationalization 
adds considerable perspective to the importance of inter-organizational design and fit in 
the disaster relief context. 
In order to illustrate this application case more fully, we draw from Contingency 
Theory and speculate a bit on an alternate, inter-organizational design that may have 
contributed to greater dynamic stability. Notice that we use the term design here even 
though the inter-organizational collectivity observed was never “designed” per se; rather 
the implicit design emerged through organizational action and interaction. Notice also 
that we draw from (organization) Contingency Theory to address an inter-organizational 
design problem; although imperfect, as noted above, such theory has expanded over the 
years to apply increasingly to multi-organizational designs in the inter-organizational 
context (Nissen & Burton, 2011). 
In terms of an inter-organizational design alternative, the environmental context of 
conflict and mistrust between organizational participants stands out as a particularly 
dominant contingency in terms of results observed and reported through the tsunami case. 
The inter-organizational collectivity that emerged to provide disaster relief appears to 
have provided poor fit with respect to this aspect of its environment. Hence an inter-
organizational redesign to address such poor environmental fit would represent a theory-
consistent approach to take. Say, for instance, that the Indonesian and foreign militaries 
were able to embrace the non-government organizations as important partners and work 
to at least mitigate areas of major conflict between them. As such the inter-organizational 
collectivity may have managed to at least resolve one of the crippling conflicts 
experienced (i.e., between military and non-government organizations), which could have 
reduced the instability penalty and corresponding opportunity loss.  
As such, consider some kind of inter-organizational Adhocracy or Divisionalized 
Structure design (Mintzberg, 1979) that includes military and non-government 
organizations alike. Either design would require an inter-organizational leader to both 
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assume an influential role and be accepted in such role by the other organizational 
participants. Indeed, the Indonesian Government assumed a role along these lines in May 
2005, and the level of conflict decreased, but this took place after five months of inter-
organizational conflict and struggle and after many of the participating organizations had 
left the collectivity. In the Adhocracy design, the various organizations would coordinate 
only loosely and work according to their own, self-selected, core competencies within the 
Operating Core of an inter-organizational collectivity. In the Divisionalized Structure, 
such organizations would coordinate more formally with a central authority and work 
according to its, negotiated or assigned, priorities as separate divisions of an inter-
organizational collectivity. Given the emergent and emergency nature of tsunami relief 
efforts, the former would appear to be more likely and responsive than the latter, unless 
considerable preplanning and inter-organizational preparation were to take place well 
before a disaster strikes. 
In terms of the case and dynamic fit model, by simply deconflicting their activities, the 
inter-organizational collectivity could potentially raise its performance from Level 1to 
Level 2 (SAS-065, 2010). This new trajectory is delineated by a thick dashed line in 
Figure 10. Notice that even a one-level increase in maturity level such as this would cut 
the associated instability penalty and opportunity loss in half (i.e., to 5 level-months from 
the 10 level-months observed). Considering the implications in terms of human death and 
suffering, this represents 50,000 lives that may have been saved and 125,000 people that 
may have avoided displacement. We imply in no way that inter-organizational design and 
collaboration is easy—indeed, we study it because it is difficult—but rather we seek to 
illustrate how the associated poor dynamic fit can be measured, compared across 
different inter-organizational designs, and related to meaningful performance 
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Figure 10 Improved Dynamic Stability: Tsunami Relief Application 
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B. MANEUVERABILITY ILLUSTRATION 
Figure 11 illustrates our subsequent application of the dynamic fit model to the 
tsunami relief effort in terms of Step 2. This illustration is very similar to the 
maneuverability figures presented above for airplanes (see Figure 6) and organizations 
(see Figure 7), yet it also reflects many aspects of our tsunami relief case application 
above. Indeed, the entire trajectory and dynamic stability illustration from Figure 9 is 
repeated here, including the calculated instability penalty of 10 level-months represented 
by the area beneath the characteristic modal level (i.e., maturity level 3). Notice that we 
return here to the trajectory as observed in the case and as delineated via Figure 9, not the 
redesigned inter-organizational collectivity represented in Figure 10. Incorporation of 
redesign alternatives into the discussion and figures is straightforward, but we wish to 



















Penalty : 6 L-mo
Instability Penalty: 10 L-mo
 
Figure 11 Maneuverability: Tsunami Relief Application 
 
In addition, we draw further from the case to delineate the required level (i.e., maturity 
level 4) of sophistication and efficacy in terms of inter-organizational collaboration and 
management. The trajectory corresponding to this required level is clearly above both the 
characteristic modal level and observed trajectory. Although this, required level does not 
represent a goal, per se, we can use it as a goal proxy for purposes of instantiating the 
dynamic fit model. As such, the figure highlights additional opportunity loss—due to 
unmaneuverability penalty in this case—stemming from the inter-organizational 
collectivity being unable to maneuver to achieve the required performance level.  
This translates to an additional six level-months of opportunity loss. Here we combine 
the ten level-months of opportunity loss discussed and delineated above (i.e., the area 
beneath the characteristic modal level) stemming from instability penalty with an 
additional six level-months of loss (i.e., the area between the required level and 
characteristic modal level) stemming from the unmaneuverability penalty for a total of 16 
level-months (10 L-mo + 6 L-mo = 16 L-mo). As with the example above, this 
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unmaneuverability penalty translates to an additional 60,000 lives that could have been 
saved and 150,000 people that could have avoided displacement. 
In order to illustrate this application case more fully, we draw from more recent yet 
still developing organization theory, and we speculate still further on how other inter-
organizational designs may have contributed to greater maneuverability. We understand, 
for instance, how ambidextrous organizations (Tushman & O'Reilly, 1999) are able to 
operate simultaneously in multiple modes. Through such multimodal operation, an inter-
organizational collectivity may be able to preserve dynamic stability—and hence limit 
both the magnitude and duration of disruption from the tsunami—while enhancing 
maneuverability—and hence enabling performance at maturity level 4—at the same time. 
Our conceptual model of dynamic fit as presented above, however, indicates a 
fundamental tradeoff between stability and maneuverability, so it is unclear how such 
simultaneous enhancement of both stability and maneuverability could be effected. 
Similar arguments pertain to resilience capacity (Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005), which 
emphasizes responsiveness, flexibility and an expanded action repertoire, along with the 
capability to select and enact the corresponding routines, and organizational 
semistructures (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997), which focus on balancing order and 
flexibility. Through these latter approaches, it remains equally unclear how to enhance 
either stability or maneuverability (e.g., order or flexibility, respectively) performance 
without having to sacrifice performance of the other. Likewise with Edge organizations 
(Alberts & Hayes, 2003), which integrate aspects of Adhocracy, Professional 
Bureaucracy and Simple Structure (Gateau et al., 2007) to enable knowledge and power 
to flow from the tops and centers of (inter-)organizations to the bottoms and edges, and 
the dynamic capabilities approach (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), which prescribes 
capabilities such as timely responsiveness, rapid and flexible product innovation, along 
with management capability to coordinate and redeploy resources as key. It remains 
unclear how to achieve such goals given mutually inhibiting interactions between 
stability and maneuverability. 
Indeed, if the stability-maneuverability tradeoff is fundamental as outlined in our 
dynamic fit model, then the inter-organizational designer must sacrifice performance in 
one area for improvement in the other. Alternatively, if information or like technology 
exists that enables highly unstable—and highly maneuverable—inter-organizational 
collectivities to be controlled, or at least not fly out of control, then such technology 
would offer potential to moderate the mutually inhibiting interactions between stability 
and maneuverability. At the time of this writing, it remains unclear what kinds of 
technologies offer potential along these lines, and hence this represents a compelling 





















Organizational design has long represented a challenging endeavor, but this challenge is 
exacerbated when attempting to design collectivities comprised of multiple organizations. 
Nonetheless, we can bring to bear the rich armamentarium of Contingency Theory to help 
guide our inter-organizational design endeavors. A fundamental problem, however, stems 
from the predominate research focus on static fit, a focus that is incommensurate with the 
fundamentally dynamic nature of organizations and their environments. Most key 
organizational environments are inherently dynamic, hence the corresponding 
organizational designs required for fit are necessarily dynamic too. This problem grows 
even more severe in the context of inter-organizational design, particularly where the 
participating organizations comprising a collectivity come and go over time.  
Addressing in part some longstanding calls in the literature for more dynamic 
conceptualization of fit, a novel approach utilizes the dynamical language and integrated 
system of concepts, definitions and interrelationships from the engineering field 
Aerodynamics. Our basic conceptual model, for instance, depicts aerodynamics concepts 
and relationships between static stability, dynamic stability, maneuverability and 
technology in a manner that applies to the domains of both airplanes and organizations. 
This conceptual model of dynamic organizational fit, as another instance, also highlights 
an important, mutually inhibiting interrelationship between stability and maneuverability, 
and it illuminates the potentially enabling role of technology in terms of moderating such 
interrelationship. The extended conceptual model, as a third instance, includes 
operationalized constructs that suggest an approach to empirical measurement of the key 
concepts, and we further identify instability and unmaneuverability penalties with 
corresponding opportunity losses in terms of dynamic stability and maneuverability. 
This extended conceptual model of dynamic organizational fit, particularly with its 
operationalized constructs, outlines a theory-based framework that appears suitable for 
empirical testing. Toward this end, we illustrate its use through empirical application to a 
very complex inter-organizational case involving thousands of participating organizations 
attempting to provide multinational relief following the 2004 Indian Ocean disaster. We 
instantiate the dynamic organizational fit model using details from the case, and we 
illustrate how poor fit of the inter-organizational collectivity with its environment can be 
delineated and measured in terms of dynamic instability and opportunity loss. We further 
characterize some important implications of poor inter-organizational fit through human 
death and suffering, and we identify several topics for continued research along the lines 
of this investigation. 
For one, our airplane-organization analogies are kept purposefully very simple to 
illustrate the key points of comparison and insight. Given the considerable sophistication 
and empirical power of Aerospace Engineering, more complex applications (e.g., 
nonlinear motion, continuous time, multiple variables) are straightforward to conceive, 
and they offer potential to enrich the discussion in practical as well as theoretical ways. 
One must remain vigilant, however, and resist the temptation to treat organizations with 
the same degree of rigor and predictability as organisms. 
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For another, it remains unclear what kinds of technologies offer potential to moderate 
the mutually inhibiting interrelationship between stability and maneuverability. If 
information or like technology exists that enables highly unstable—and highly 
maneuverable—inter-organizational collectivities to be controlled, or at least not fly out 
of control, then such technology would offer potential to design whole new classes of 
organizations and inter-organizational collectivities. Relatively recent yet still developing 
organization theory covering ambidextrous organizations, resilience capacity, 
organizational semistructures, Edge organizations, dynamic capabilities and other 
approaches offer potential to elucidate the stability-maneuverability conundrum as well, 
and our dynamic organizational fit model may prove useful in terms of guiding and 
complementing research along such lines. 
As with every study, the present investigation has several limitations. Our 
dynamic organizational fit model remains relatively novel and primitive; hence it can 
benefit from considerable refinement and extension. Also, our application of the model to 
the tsunami relief efforts illustrates only one of many possible cases that could be used to 
instantiate the model and compare different inter-organizational designs in terms of 
stability, maneuverability, performance and like constructs; hence incorporation of and 
comparison with additional cases offers potential for increased insight, both into the 
dynamic fit model and inter-organizational design in the context of multinational disaster 
relief. Application of the dynamic organizational fit model to other, organizational and 
inter-organizational designs and contexts represents a wide open avenue for continued 
research along these lines as well, particularly empirical work to refine and measure the 
key dynamic fit constructs (esp. dynamic stability, maneuverability, opportunity loss). 
The research described in this article highlights ample potential for refinement and 
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